
OUR ASK OF LTC TASK FORCE MEMBERS







California Department of Insurance

Structure Concepts:

- Public Public benefit options, such as universal social assistance, vested social insurance, or targeted social assistance
- 2. Private Public support for private market solutions,
- 3. Hybrid A public benefit that is designed to coexist with supplemental or complementary private insurance



1. Public Benefit Options

| Examples | Questions | Pros | Cons |
|---|--|--|--------------------------------------|
| a. Universal Assistance | - Can this be done | - Everyone is covered | - High total program |
| - Denmark, France, Japan, | effectively at the | Cost control – ability | cost |
| Germany, Netherlands, | state level? | to negotiate and/or | - Potential loss of |
| Singapore | - How would the | regulate service | federal Medicaid |
| - Maine Universal Home Care | program be funded? | prices | contributions |
| Initiative – Universal home | - How would it interact | Potentially lower | - Political/popular |
| care proposal, assessing 3.8% | with Medicaid and | administrative costs | opposition? |
| payroll tax (split between | other federal | | |
| employee and employer) on | programs? | | |
| income over \$128k; rejected | - How would it interact | | |
| in 2018 ballot initiative | with private LTCi? | | |
| b. Vested Social Insurance: | How is LTSS funded | Less costly than | - Only vested workers, |
| - Washington Trust Act – State | for everyone who is | universal coverage | and potentially family |
| program, funded by a 0.58% | not vested? | (0.58% payroll tax | of vested workers, |
| payroll tax, paying vested | How would the | under WA plan; | are covered |
| workers a \$36,500 benefit | program be funded? | 0.5% to 1% in most | - Costly, although |
| (\$100/day for 365 days) | - How would it interact | scenarios in DHCS | significantly less |
| CLASS Act – Voluntary (opt- | with Medicaid and | Feasibility Study) | costly than a |
| out) national LTCi program | other federal | Less overlap with | universal program |
| that was included in ACA but | programs? | Medicaid (vested | May overlap with |
| repealed due to concerns | - How would it interact | workers less likely to | Medicaid to some |
| about adverse selection, high | with private LTC | qualify for Medicaid) | extent, and therefore |
| premiums, and program | insurance? | More politically | may reduce federal |
| sustainability | | feasible? | contributions |

| c. Targeted Social Assistance | - Is the benefit | - Least costly | - Will not solve larger |
|---|---|--|--|
| Hawaii Kapuna Caregivers Program – \$350 weekly benefit for unpaid family caregivers Credit for Caring Act – Proposed federal law that | meaningful? - How would it be funded? | Least likelihood for overlap with Medicaid Easier to design and implement | LTSS demographic and funding issues |
| would provide a tax credit for informal family caregivers Some have proposed a public benefit covering catastrophic losses for those with Alzheimer's disease | | | |

2. Public Support for Private Market Solutions

| Examples | Questions | Pros | Cons |
|---|---|--|--|
| a. Public-private reinsurance or risk-sharing for private LTCi Some have proposed public support (design, legislation, and/or funding) for a program that would reimburse private insurer LTCi costs for catastrophic claims or in the event of unexpected adverse claims experience | Would this materially reduce LTCi premiums? Would any reduction in LTCi premiums produce a sufficient improvement in LTCi sales? | Would provide insurance companies with more certainty when estimating premiums Not disruptive – largely maintains status quo Less costly Comparatively simple | Would it motivate more private insurers to enter the market? Milliman Feasibility Study in Michigan found that a reinsurance program had "limited potential" to increase LTCi prevalence, as the costs would likely be passed to consumers Political/popular opposition (could be viewed as a subsidy) |
| b. Promote/Incentivize new products Minnesota is supporting development of a term life policy that converts to LTCi at a certain age LTCi in Medicare Advantage – Plans may now include supplemental home care | Would the new products materially reduce LTCi premiums or increase LTCi sales? Will an opt-in Medicare Advantage plan be actuarially viable? | Not disruptive – largely maintains status quo Very little cost for state Comparatively simple | Would the new options motivate more private insurers to enter the market? Likely not sufficient, in isolation, to solve larger demographic and funding problems |

| ve – - Any material benefit |
|-------------------------------------|
| tains is likely to increase |
| plan costs |
| ost for - Might drive Med |
| Supp carriers from |
| ely simple the market |
| - Likely not sufficient, |
| in isolation, to solve |
| larger demographic |
| |
| and funding problems |
| ve – - Would the expanded |
| atus quo options motivate |
| ost for more private insurers |
| to enter the market? |
| ely simple - Likely not sufficient, |
| in isolation, to solve |
| larger demographic |
| and funding problems |
| |

3. Hybrid Public-Private Solutions

| Examples | Questions | Pros | Cons |
|--|---|--|--|
| a. Public benefit supplemented by private insurance Option to purchase supplemental coverage – to provide additional coverage or services, or to pay providers not participating in public benefit Option to purchase complementary insurance – covering co-pays, share-of- cost, deductibles, etc. Supplemental and complementary options exist in most countries with public benefits | Would new legislation be required to allow for or facilitate the sale of supplemental or complementary coverage? Would supplemental or complementary coverage be affordable? | Will help keep costs of public benefit down Allows consumers greater freedom to choose the amount and types of coverage they want Would help to fill gaps in the public system | Private carriers would need to enter/adapt to a new market |



Program Coverage Concepts: Front-end, Back-end, or Comprehensive Coverage



California Department of Insurance

Coverage Concepts:

- 1. Front-end Benefits payable at or near the beginning of an individual's eligibility for LTSS
- 2. Back-end Benefit payable after an individual is impaired for a specified period of time
- 3. Comprehensive Benefit payable for initial and backend (catastrophic) LTSS needs



| Examples | Questions | Pros | Cons |
|------------------------|-------------------------|---|----------------------------------|
| - Washington Trust Act | - Does a front-end | - Everyone who qualifies | - Pays less per claim than |
| – State program | benefit reduce | and needs LTSS receives a | back-end and |
| funded by a 0.58% | spend-down / | benefit | comprehensive |
| payroll tax, paying | impoverishment? | Less costly than back-end | - Benefit likely insufficient |
| vested workers a | - Would it help | and comprehensive | to cover most LTSS costs |
| \$36,500 benefit | individuals who | coverage (0.58% payroll tax | (median LTSS costs are |
| (\$100/day for 365 | would otherwise | under WA plan; 0.5% - 1% | over \$100,000, 75 th |
| days) that is indexed | qualify for Medicaid? | payroll tax for most | percentile is about |
| for inflation. | - How would it interact | program scenarios in DHCS | \$250 <i>,</i> 000) |
| | with private LTC | Feasibility Study) | - Individuals whose LTSS |
| | insurance? | - More predictable costs | expenditures exceed |
| | | - Likely less overlap with | public benefit will need to |
| | | Medicaid than back-end | spend down any remaining |
| | | and comprehensive | assets before qualifying for |
| | | | Medicaid |

1. Front-end – Benefits payable at or near the beginning of an individual's eligibility for LTSS

| Examples | Questions | Pros | Cons |
|------------------------|---------------------------------------|--|--|
| - WISH Act – | - Does a back-end | Generally pays more than | More expensive than |
| proposed federal | benefit reduce | front-end (longer | front-end (1.83% - 3.32% |
| catastrophic LTC | spend-down? | maximum benefit | payroll tax in scenarios |
| insurance program; | - Would it help | duration) | modeled in DHCS |
| 0.6% payroll tax split | individuals who | - Often more beneficial | Feasibility Study) |
| between employee | would otherwise | than front-end for those | - Helps fewer people (about |
| and employer; | qualify for Medicaid? | with high claim costs | 50% of LTC claims end |
| waiting period of 1-5 | Should it exclude | More likely to reduce | within 2 years) |
| years, depending on | individuals who | state Medicaid spending | Significant overlap with |
| income; \$3,600/ | would otherwise | - Easier for private market | Medicaid |
| month benefit; | qualify for Medicaid? | to design supplemental | - Potential loss of federal |
| vesting after 10 | - How would it | front-end coverage (front- | Medicaid contributions |
| years of | interact with private | end risk/liability is easier | Many will be |
| contributions | LTC insurance? | to predict) | impoverished during a |
| | | | waiting period |
| | | | - More unpredictable costs |

2. Back-end – Benefit payable after an individual is impaired for a specified period of time

| Examples | Questions | Pros | Cons |
|-----------------------|-------------------------------------|---|--|
| - Denmark, France, | - Can this be done | - Everyone who qualifies | High total program |
| Japan, Germany, | effectively at the | and needs LTSS | cost |
| Netherlands, | state level? | receives a benefit | Potential loss of |
| Singapore | How would it be | Cost control – ability to | federal Medicaid |
| - Maine Universal | funded? | negotiate and/or | contributions |
| Home Care | How would it | regulate service prices | - Political/popular |
| Initiative – A | interact with | Potentially lower | opposition? |
| universal home | Medicaid and | administrative costs | More unpredictable |
| care proposal, | other federal | | program costs (due to |
| assessing 3.8% | programs? | | more variable |
| payroll tax (1.9% | How would it | | catastrophic liability) |
| from employee, | interact with | | |
| 1.9% from | private LTC | | |
| employer) on | insurance? | | |
| income over | | | |
| \$128k, was | | | |
| rejected by a 63- | | | |
| 37 margin in | | | |
| 2018 ballot | | | |
| initiative | | | |

3. Comprehensive – Benefit payable for initial and back-end (catastrophic) LTSS needs



Please fill out the questionnaire

We will tally results and distribute them in advance of the next Task Force Meeting!